The Clarity Aspect in Buddhism

[Apech]

58 minutes ago, liminal_luke said:

Years ago, I remember reading impassioned screeds on the forum about obscure (to me) philosophical differences between adherents of various eastern spiritual traditions.  Perhaps that was the Buddha wars people are talking about?  There was a lot of jargon I didn´t understand but the level of discord seemed silly to me at the time.  Why not just sit and be aware of something -- or nothing in particular -- and be done with it?  Given how forum discussion has evolved since, those discussions now seem almost saintly. 

 

Yeah but what if you are just sitting and what you become aware of is some moron on internet saying something dumb????

 

 

[Earl Grey]

10 minutes ago, Apech said:

 

Yeah but what if you are just sitting and what you become aware of is some moron on internet saying something dumb????

 

 

Hey, don’t out yourself! 
 

Spoiler

You know what happens to whistleblowers, right?

Spoiler

But then again, it’s totally worth it. 
 

Spoiler

So accept your awareness of idiots on the Internet!

Spoiler

...stop looking at me.

Spoiler

Hey, I said stop!!!

 

 

 

 

 

[Creation]

2 hours ago, forestofemptiness said:

I don't think either actually worked in a Vedantic tradition, however, or had their "realization" confirmed by a lineage master (in either tradition as far as I know).

For whatever it's worth Vajrahridaya was raised in Muktananda's Siddha Yoga lineage via his mother and was eventually initiated and studied and practiced intensively in it for years, and xabir2005 immersed himself in Ramana and Nisargadatta and their students for years. 

 

But that's not working directly in a Vedantic tradition with realization confirmed by a lineage holder, so I guess we'll just have to take their descriptions of their realization at face value then, similar to many Western non-duality teachers who didn't train in a Traditional Vedanta framework.  For instance,

2 hours ago, dwai said:

It is really not an experience at all — rather it is a realization/recognition, followed by a permanent shift of perspective from that of a limited mind-body-personality to pure awareness.

This is exactly how xabir2005 described the realization he had that he identified with Vedantic realization.  I mean exactly.  But because he was saying he later went beyond it, it was "You are describing a realization not an experience", "You didn't have your realization confirmed by a lineage holder", "You don't really understand Vedanta" etc etc.  

 

Here is a further line of reasoning to consider.  Some teachers who are within the Vedantic fold sufficiently broadly defined distinguish two aspects of realization.  First, the "permanent shift of perspective from that of a limited mind-body-personality to pure awareness" as dwai puts it.  Second, the realization that those limited mind-body-personality experiences are non-dual from pure awareness.  For instance, Bhagavan Ramana's two lines
"The world is an illusion, Brahman alone is real
Brahman is the world"

From the perspective of the second realization, only realizing the first is subtly dualistic, even though it is often labeled non-dual because it is "one without a second" as everything other than pure awareness is seen to be an illusion.  But if there can be subtly dualistic tendencies even after a major shift in perception confirmed by a lineage holder, could there not also be realization beyond this?  Why not multiple layers and types of dualistic view that are let go of in stages, each realization seeming like the Ultimate Truth until you get to the next one? 

 

This clarity about subtle details and willingness to say, "as absolute as what I have realized seems, I'm willing to look further" is something I value immensely, whatever label a person puts on their path. That's why I have chosen the teachers that I have.  YMMV.

[Nungali]

6 hours ago, old3bob said:

Since Seth has been mentioned several times....didn't he go over to some type of magical/sorcery path?  It's been a long time but I remember some later posts like that and I don't recall them being about Buddhism or Hinduism.

 

I had many a magical discussion with him , but I thought he was in Melbourne  ?  

 

or maybe I am mixing up someone with a similar name  ?

 

Back i the early days I remember a Mod announcing  " Hey guys , there is a fight in the Pit ,  ( I cant remember the names  but a Buddhist and a HIndu ) have you seen this ! ? "     They where going at it , hammer and tongs , fighting dirty , prejudiced, racialist , insults , politics ,you name it ... what a donnybrook !  .

 

But that was back in the days when  mad Turkish Muslim  Samurai  astral projecting 'Daoists' stalked the site  (looking for wrongdoers and miscreants  to punish .  

[Nungali]

4 hours ago, dwai said:

 

The biggest misconception is that the Self can be “experienced”. It is really not an experience at all — rather it is a realization/recognition, followed by a permanent shift of perspective from that of a limited mind-body-personality to pure awareness. 
 

Advaita Vedanta teachers will say, “if you can experience it, it is not the Self”.

 

 

 

 

 

No no no ... thats not true !   

 

Bloody Hindus !   

 

< rant about my view >

 

Then I increase the font size .

 

Now I will make it red to intimidate you and you show you my anger .

 

Plus some bolding and excessive punctuation  !!!!!!

 

 

 

.... there !   That sure showed him !     

 

 

 

 

 

.

Edited August 10, 2021 by Nungali

[dwai]

5 hours ago, Creation said:

Here is a further line of reasoning to consider.  Some teachers who are within the Vedantic fold sufficiently broadly defined distinguish two aspects of realization.  First, the "permanent shift of perspective from that of a limited mind-body-personality to pure awareness" as dwai puts it.  Second, the realization that those limited mind-body-personality experiences are non-dual from pure awareness.  For instance, Bhagavan Ramana's two lines
"The world is an illusion, Brahman alone is real
Brahman is the world"

That is no different from Form is Void and Void is Form in my mind, or Samsara is Nirvana and Nirvana is Samsara...just different labels we apply to realization and experiences. The term "illusion" used in place of "mithya" is not strictly used to say the world doesn't exist, but rather, the names and forms that we think of as the world are ephemeral (impermanent). Brahman/Self, which is ever-present, never-changing is "sat" (existence itself). 

5 hours ago, Creation said:

From the perspective of the second realization, only realizing the first is subtly dualistic, even though it is often labeled non-dual because it is "one without a second" as everything other than pure awareness is seen to be an illusion.  But if there can be subtly dualistic tendencies even after a major shift in perception confirmed by a lineage holder, could there not also be realization beyond this?  Why not multiple layers and types of dualistic view that are let go of in stages, each realization seeming like the Ultimate Truth until you get to the next one? 

It might seem that way, but it is a process of unfolding clarity. In the Vedantic worldview (Advaita Vedanta at least), there is the triumvirate of "jiva (self), Ishwara (creator), and Jagat (world)" to start with. Usually, the process is first  "self is Self, which is none other than Ishwara's Self as well". Then there is the clarity of unfolding that the world is also Self. Swami Sarvapriyananda says, "the limited self expands to become the Self of everything". But that is the classical way. In the modern context, it is "self is Pure Awareness" and then "all phenomena are also made up of the same awareness". 

5 hours ago, Creation said:

 

This clarity about subtle details and willingness to say, "as absolute as what I have realized seems, I'm willing to look further" is something I value immensely, whatever label a person puts on their path. That's why I have chosen the teachers that I have.  YMMV.

I like that too. But imho, there is no "realization" following true realization, just dropping of conditioning and increasing clarity. Some might think of it as semantics...I don't know...on another day, I might say something different  

[old3bob]

13 hours ago, Nungali said:

 

 

 

 

No no no ... thats not true !   

 

Bloody Hindus !   

 

< rant about my view >

 

Then I increase the font size .

 

Now I will make it red to intimidate you and you show you my anger .

 

Plus some bolding and excessive punctuation  !!!!!!

 

 

.... there !   That sure showed him !     

 

 

to back that up shouldn't there be 6 or 7 volumes of text...(not all at once but spread out over several days)

Edited August 11, 2021 by old3bob

[dwai]

33 minutes ago, old3bob said:

 

to back that up there shouldn't there be 6 or 7 volumes of text...(not all at once but spread out over several days)

Now, friends, we are NOT trying to actually start another BuddhaBum War, okay? Anyone who might feel offended by the antics should know that it's all being done in good humor. 

 

 

[Earl Grey]

1 hour ago, dwai said:

Now, friends, we are NOT trying to actually start another BuddhaBum War, okay? Anyone who might feel offended by the antics should know that it's all being done in good humor. 

 

 

“These are not the droids yakshas you’re looking for.”

[Earl Grey]

7 hours ago, Nungali said:

 

 

 

 

No no no ... thats not true !   

 

Bloody Hindus !   

 

< rant about my view >

 

Then I increase the font size .

 

Now I will make it red to intimidate you and you show you my anger .

 

Plus some bolding and excessive punctuation  !!!!!!

 

 

 

.... there !   That sure showed him !     

 

 

 

 

 

.

Market a free PDF, talk about sitting in full lotus for four hours at a time, go off topic with climate change and the San Bushmen while connecting it to Euclidean harmonics, and you just may be on to something to help stop an argument and flame war...

 

Spoiler

By boring people to death!

 

[dwai]

8 minutes ago, Earl Grey said:

Market a free PDF, talk about sitting in full lotus for four hours at a time, go off topic with climate change and the San Bushmen while connecting it to Euclidean harmonics, and you just may be on to something to help stop an argument and flame war...

 

  Reveal hidden contents

By boring people to death!

 

Aw stop ripping on that poor man…I feel bad for him. He has a brilliant mind (maybe too brilliant)…I hope he’s doing okay. 

[Earl Grey]

6 minutes ago, dwai said:

Aw stop ripping on that poor man…I feel bad for him. He has a brilliant mind (maybe too brilliant)…I hope he’s doing okay. 

Don’t worry; it’s a one-off joke for those of us who remember. Anything more would just be mean (and a violation of forum rules...)

[old3bob]

8 hours ago, old3bob said:

 

to back that up shouldn't there be 6 or 7 volumes of text...(not all at once but spread out over several days)

 

see your six or seven volumes and raise you a wall full...(all at once  )

Edited August 11, 2021 by old3bob

[forestofemptiness]

18 hours ago, Creation said:

For whatever it's worth Vajrahridaya was raised in Muktananda's Siddha Yoga lineage via his mother and was eventually initiated and studied and practiced intensively in it for years, and xabir2005 immersed himself in Ramana and Nisargadatta and their students for years. 

 

For me, it strikes me as a bit of hubris. Classically, many people left their homes and life and practiced full time for many, many years, often enduring incredible hardships. To think that in the modern day, with the internet and far less effort, people have met and exceeded the realization of Ramana Maharshi, Shakarcharya, Swami Vivekananda, etc. strikes me as hollow and in bad faith. If that were even partially so, then certainly their posts would be modern spiritual classics, as they exceed the scriptures and commentary of an entire tradition. And do we think if these people were alive today, they'd be spending all their time compiling quotes and arguing on the Daobums? 

 

There are a few issues at play. One is the use of similar terms, but the meaning changes and becomes more refined over time as one progresses. Accordingly, the Self may be initially presented in a gross way, and that concept is often refined until it is exhausted. But some one can easily take initial or intermediate teachings on the Self and mistake them for final realization. The term I have heard for this is mistaking the tail of a snake for the dragon. 

 

The other issue is that teachings, especially written ones, take the form of concepts. A lot of people like to dismiss any teaching as "too conceptual," comparing any conceptual teaching to (an often imaginary) non-conceptual realization. Any statement can be deconstructed in this manner, leaving only an ambiguous silence that can mean anything. 

 

For these and other reasons, it becomes indispensable to have a teacher more realized than oneself as a guide (unless you are, say, a lineage starting spiritual genius), which is what every tradition says. 

 

 

[Creation]

13 hours ago, dwai said:

It might seem that way, but it is a process of unfolding clarity.

...

imho, there is no "realization" following true realization, just dropping of conditioning and increasing clarity.

Ah, this is an excellent point for discussion.  So, the "sudden awakening" schools of Buddhism I am familiar with would agree with you on this.  I even have seen xabir2005 and his teacher Thusness say this same thing on their blog.  So what is the disagreement?  What it is that is let go of in this process of dropping conditioning and unfolding clarity. 

 

Even in Advaita there is not total agreement on this - there are two schools, Ajatavada and ... the one that's not Ajatavada, don't remember it's name .  I'm only familiar with the presentation of arising in Sri Atmananda's Direct Path, not Traditional Vedanta.  But the impression I get is that in terms of the difference in unfolding of this clarity, in Ajatavada even the very concept of arising is eventually let go of, whereas in the other school of Advaita it isn't.  This is a really subtle thing, so it's not too different.  But it seems to me that the clarity of someone with full realization in the Ajatavada school has developed a little further than someone in the other school. 

 

If someone had that first awakening to pure consciousness, but no one ever pointed out to them that the clarity can unfold further until subject-object duality has been dropped, they would be very unlikely to ever realize that on their own.  The awesomeness of pure consciousness is too convincing.  Actually, someone could point that out to them, and they might say, "No way, that sounds totally crazy, how could this limited body-mind which I have realized is not my true self be non-dual be from the infinite pure consciousness that I have realized is my True Self?" if they hadn't already accepted Advaita philosophy as authoritative.  Similarly, if no one ever pointed out that even the very subtle remaining sense of something arising could be dropped, that person would be very unlikely to figure it out on their own.  Hence the value of both subtle pointers and being open to them. 

 

So, as you know, sudden awakening schools of Mahayana Buddhism agree with Advaita that the unfolding of clarity eventually leads to the dropping of duality entirely.  In this case it's a bit arbitrary if you call the remaining non-dual experience true self or no self, because there is no longer any separation between self and other.  Hence the idea that Advaita and Buddhism are pointing to the same thing from the positive and negative directions, respectively.  But it can seem that even in this non-dual clarity, consciousness is still primary to the illusory objects that are ultimately non-dual from it.  As far as I can distill down the essence of what xabir2005 and Vajrahridaya were saying, they claim the process of unfolding of clarity and dropping of conditioning can proceed even further so that this very subtle duality implied by the primacy of consciousness to name-and-form is dropped.  In this case, calling the remaining non-dual consciousness "true self" makes even less sense, hence the preference for the description as "no-self". 

 

Once I understood what they were saying in this way, I was perfectly happy to accept that that was indeed possible.  To address @forestofemptiness's concerns, I have no idea if Ramana, Shankara, etc. had realized this or not.  I'm not claiming they hadn't.  But their writings don't seem to point to it explicitly.  Then again, the writings of many great Buddhist masters don't point to it explicitly either.  Again, I personally value the guidance of people who can address all these subtle dualistic attachments in detail.  But I also value the guidance of of people who powerfully point to initial realization of intrinsic clarity!  (And people who powerfully transmit deep samadhi, great moral character, etc.)  Simply knowing what is out there is often the first step in moving towards it, hence my posting about it. 

[Apech]

56 minutes ago, forestofemptiness said:

 

For me, it strikes me as a bit of hubris. Classically, many people left their homes and life and practiced full time for many, many years, often enduring incredible hardships. To think that in the modern day, with the internet and far less effort, people have met and exceeded the realization of Ramana Maharshi, Shakarcharya, Swami Vivekananda, etc. strikes me as hollow and in bad faith. If that were even partially so, then certainly their posts would be modern spiritual classics, as they exceed the scriptures and commentary of an entire tradition. And do we think if these people were alive today, they'd be spending all their time compiling quotes and arguing on the Daobums? 

 

There are a few issues at play. One is the use of similar terms, but the meaning changes and becomes more refined over time as one progresses. Accordingly, the Self may be initially presented in a gross way, and that concept is often refined until it is exhausted. But some one can easily take initial or intermediate teachings on the Self and mistake them for final realization. The term I have heard for this is mistaking the tail of a snake for the dragon. 

 

The other issue is that teachings, especially written ones, take the form of concepts. A lot of people like to dismiss any teaching as "too conceptual," comparing any conceptual teaching to (an often imaginary) non-conceptual realization. Any statement can be deconstructed in this manner, leaving only an ambiguous silence that can mean anything. 

 

For these and other reasons, it becomes indispensable to have a teacher more realized than oneself as a guide (unless you are, say, a lineage starting spiritual genius), which is what every tradition says. 

 

 

 

All teachings are conceptual - it is reality itself which is beyond concept.  Not disagreeing with you just emphasising a point.

[Apech]

I find it interesting - and quite amusing - that those 'systems' which claim non-conceptuality end up, in order to elaborate their claims highly conceptualised and disputational around terms.

 

For me these days, only 'systems' which have a great work such as the creation of the diamond body, the immortal foetus etc. have any validity.

 

Unpopular Opinion : Realising consciousness in a neo-advaitan sense is pure garbage.  Discuss!

[forestofemptiness]

2 hours ago, Apech said:

 

All teachings are conceptual - it is reality itself which is beyond concept.  Not disagreeing with you just emphasising a point.

 

Non-conceptuality is a concept, so see you've reified it, and in so doing have missed the vital point. 

 

As stated in the Mulamadhyamakakaria: 

Quote

 

अस्तीति शाश्वतग्राहो नास्तीत्युच्चेददर्शनं

astīti śāśvatagrāho nāstītyuccedadarśanaṁ

 

तस्माद् अस्तित्वनास्तित्वे नाश्रीयेत विचक्षणः।

tasmād astitvanāstitve nāśrīyeta vicakṣaṇaḥ

To say "it is" is to grasp for permanence. To say "it is not" is to adopt the view of nihilism.

Therefore a wise person does not say "exists" or "does not exist".

 

 

And let us not forget the Dharani of Entering into Nonconceptuality: 

 

Quote

For what reason, noble sons, is the nonconceptual realm called ‘nonconceptual’? It completely transcends all conceptual analysis, completely transcends all imputations of instruction and illustration, completely transcends all conceptual signs, completely transcends all imputation via the sense faculties, completely transcends imputation as sense objects, completely transcends imputation as cognitive representations, and is not based in the cognitive obscurations or in the obscurations of the afflictive and secondary afflictive emotions. For this reason the nonconceptual realm is called ‘nonconceptual.’

 

Yes, that was a joke. 

[Nungali]

20 hours ago, old3bob said:

 

to back that up shouldn't there be 6 or 7 volumes of text...(not all at once but spread out over several days)

 

yes ... and then the BIG GUNS come out  ......

 

 

 

a coloured background with opposing coloured text , large font and bolded

 

 

My fav response :

 

Spoiler

Argumentation is a crucial component of our lives since in the absence of rational debate our legal, political, educational, and even scientific systems would not be possible (Mercier and Sperber, 2011). Although psychology has studied several aspects of argumentation, such as its role in social engagement (Means and Voss, 1996), in learning and education (Asterhan and Schwarz, 2007, 2009; Mercer, 2009; Howe, 2010), and in the construction of knowledge (Mason and Santi, 1994; Leitão, 2000, 2008; Schwarz, 2009), there is still no integrated area of research on the “psychology of argumentation” (Hornikx and Hahn, 2012). Recently, Hornikx and Hahn (2012) have employed this concept for encapsulating both theoretical and experimental accounts that mutually inform separate research communities studying human reasoning and argumentation.

Furthermore, although classical theories of argumentation have been devoted to understanding argumentative processes both in academic and daily-life contexts, there is no common theoretical ground between these theories. For instance, rhetoric considers argumentation to be a tool for persuading the audience, whereas dialectics consider argumentation to be the quintessence of a critical discussion aiming to determine the acceptability of a particular stance or point of view (Wenzel, 1990). Despite these theoretical discrepancies, for both rhetoric and dialectics the acceptability of an argument is determined by a set of norms or logical rules which allow classifying an argument as veridical or fallacious, i.e., the so-called normative approaches for argumentation.

We think the current challenge in front of psychology is to bring together the cognitive and normative accounts of argumentation. In order to achieve this, we claim that the psychological mechanisms of argumentative processes should be investigated by employing more descriptive and experimental accounts. In line with this idea, recent work has started to examine empirically the descriptive, psychological aspect of classical argumentative fallacies. In particular, modern approaches for studying argumentation such as Bayesian theory (Hahn and Oaksford, 2007; Corner and Hahn, 2009; Corner et al., 2011), the pragma-dialectical account (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004; van Eemeren et al., 2009, 2012), epistemic vigilance (Sperber et al., 2010), and evolutionary psychology (Sperber and Mercier, 2012), have proposed plausible explanations for the mechanisms and cognitive aspects of argumentation in more ecologically valid contextual accounts. In this article, we show how these descriptive approaches shed light onto the psychological mechanisms of argumentation.

Here we analyze experimental evidence of two classical argumentative structures. Specifically, we focus on the Bayesian analysis of the slippery slope argument and the pragma-dialectical analysis of the ad hominem argument. We think that further experimental research in the area is needed to increase the dialog between argumentation theory and cognitive psychology and thus provide a step toward an experimental account of argumentation.

Go to:

CASE 1: THE SLIPPERY SLOPE ARGUMENT

The slippery slope argument is an argument from consequences traditionally conceptualized as an informal fallacy (Walton, 1992). The argument starts by considering an execution of a seemingly harmless action. The argument exhibits how the implementation of the action would inevitably lead to an undesired or detrimental consequence. Then, a conclusion is reached that aims to avoid the undesired consequence. Here is an example of a slippery slope argument:

“The government should not negotiate with terrorists (1). Once the government starts considering terrorists as valid interlocutors (3), we will start having dozens of new terrorist attacks (2).”

We can see from this example that the structure of a slippery slope argument can be defined by three core aspects: (1) an initial decision intuitively acceptable; (2) a “case” or “situation” evaluated as unacceptable or dangerous; and (3) a process or mechanism by which violating the initial decision would facilitate the occurrence of that “case” or “situation” (Rizzo and Whitman, 2003).

In argumentation, the structure of the slippery slope argument has raised the question of its highly successful implementation in contexts in which a subject or a group of subjects attempts to persuade the audience in favor of an argument even when the argument or its usage are incorrect. In particular, cognitive psychology has initiated the investigation of the mechanisms underlying persuasiveness of the slippery slope argument by employing the cognitive concept of similarity and statistical tools from Bayesian theory (Corner et al., 2011).

SIMILARITY AND THE SLIPPERY SLOPE ARGUMENT: A BAYESIAN APPROACH

Similarity is the cognitive process of perceiving objects as a global unity when they share similar physical characteristics and as different objects when they do not (Tversky, 1977). Thus, similarity represents one of the main “grouping” principles in psychology. The classical approach in cognitive psychology assumes that concepts can be represented in a common problem space in which they are depicted as points in that space. Then, similarity is operationally defined as the distance between concepts (i.e., points) in that space. Objects that are psychologically more similar would be closer than ones that are dissimilar (Tversky, 1977).

Recent experimental evidence from the study of informal fallacies and decision making have shed light on the psychological mechanisms of the slippery slope argument by employing the notion of similarity (Hahn and Oaksford, 2007; Corner and Hahn, 2009; Corner et al., 2011). Specifically, this line of research has tested the hypothesis that the more similar the antecedents in an argumentative chain are, the more persuasive (or slippery) the slope will be. In other words, the mechanism underlying the acceptance of a slippery slope argument would be related to the degree of similarity between the antecedents of the argumentative structure.

In the last years, this hypothesis has been tested under the Bayesian account of argumentation (Corner et al., 2011). This approach considers fallacies as inductive conditional arguments in which the strength of the argument depends on the probability of the precedent actually preceding the consequent. These probabilities are determined by previous experience. In the case of the example described above, the argument is convincing when the conditional probability of the government negotiating with terrorists (i.e., antecedent A) is high due to the increase in terrorist attacks (i.e., consequent C). Then the calculation of the probability is P(C|A). Thus, the conclusion consists of negating the antecedent since the antecedent has a negative utility. The underlying mechanism fixing the relevant probabilities for the model, i.e., P(C|A), follows the continuous change of boundaries—as in distance in similarity between the categories. Then, accepting the antecedent in a slippery slope argument makes us prone to accept the consequence. In other words, accepting one element (i.e., antecedent—talking to terrorists) as part of a category (i.e., the consequence—terrorist attacks) would lead us to accept another element (i.e., negotiating) as part of the same category.

Corner et al. (2011) proposed a psychological mechanism of the slippery slope argument consisting of the re-appraisal of category boundaries based on the similarity or closeness between items in conceptual space. The rationale is that classifying an item a under a category F increases the probability that a further item b will be classified under the same category F. The authors employed a type of argument that allows to calculate similarity in the context of a decision making task. Thus, the experiment comprised of deciding whether action A should be carried out or not. In one example, participants had to decide whether an area is eligible or not for the status of “Outstanding Natural Beauty” by considering its inhabiting species. For instance:

Scarathon is home to 224 species of large animals.

Sellenfeld is home to 179 species of large animals.

Decision: Eligible for Area of Outstanding Natural Beauty status.

In these experiments, participants were asked to make a categorization decision of their own (i.e., whether Sellenfeld was eligible for the Outstanding Natural Beauty status), based on the information they had just read. The experiments were designed to demonstrate that the evaluation of a slippery slope argument is directly related to the re-appraisal of categorical boundaries. Specifically, the information was presented either as a categorization task, or as decision-making task. Experimenters showed that when a and b are similar, identical items a lead different groups of participants—regardless of whether they performed a categorization or a decision-making task—to evaluate slippery slope arguments as strong and to categorize new items, b, as F, when a had been categorized as F. However, this did not happen when a and b were dissimilar. When a had been categorized as F and a and b were dissimilar, the same participants, who initially rejected categorizing b as F, re-appraised this decision on being told about an intermediate item c that was similar to b, and that was also categorized as F.

These results show that when both the beginning and end of the argumentative chain of a slippery slope argument are similar, the probability that both were perceived as belonging to the same category is higher and hence the persuasive strength of the argument is stronger. These results suggest that the persuasiveness of the slippery slope argument is due to the concatenation of antecedents/evidence and consequences/reasons that are perceived as similar.

In conclusion, the above study shows how the concept of similarity and probabilistic tools of cognitive psychology can be used for shedding light on an old philosophical problem in argumentation, i.e., the problem of the persuasiveness of the slippery slope argument. This line of research suggests that an evidence-based, descriptive approach can be useful to move forward the traditionally more normatively oriented discussions of the Argumentation field.

Go to:

CASE 2: THE AD HOMINEM ARGUMENT

A second classical argumentative fallacy that has initiated some empirical investigation is the ad hominem argument. In an “Ad hominem” argument, it is the person who makes a statement rather than the veridicality of the statement that is attacked by the opponent. In other words, the proponent of a statement is targeted instead of the statement itself (Walton, 1998). According to van Eemeren et al. (2012), there are three variants of this fallacy: “(a) an abusive variant of ad hominem, in which the other party’s person is attacked directly by depicting them as stupid, bad, or unreliable, (b) a circumstantial variant, in which the other party is attacked indirectly by casting suspicion on their motives, and (c) a tu quoque variant, in which the other party is attacked by pointing out a contradiction in their words or between their words and their deeds” (p. 347). Recent experimental research (van Eemeren et al., 2009) has shown that participants’ judgments of how reasonable an ad hominem fallacy is are a function of the strength of the argument that targets the proponent. Thus, the abusive variant of the ad hominem argument is judged as the most unreasonable and the tu quoque as less so.

The fact that experimental subjects judge the abusive ad hominem as an unreasonable discussion move raises the question of why is it that this fallacy occurs as often in argumentative discourse (i.e., oral and written) without it being recognized as a fallacy by the audience. In other words, the unreasonableness of this fallacy is easily recognized in experiments but in real life situations this fallacy remains undetected more often than not. Recently, this question has been tested from a pragma-dialectical perspective using the concept of “strategic maneuvering” (van Eemeren et al., 2012).

PRAGMA-DIALECTICS AND “STRATEGIC MANEUVERING”

Recent work in argumentation theory has started to empirically test the psychological concerns about the extent to which people are prone to employing procedural norms in rational argument rather than focusing solely on normative issues as traditional argumentation research does (van Eemeren et al., 2009). These studies have been conducted under the so-cal^{led pragma-dialectical account of argumentation (van Eemeren and Grootendorst, 2004). While strictly logical approaches are focused on the study of arguments as ready-made products, pragma-dialectics is developed to study the different kinds of procedural rules that define reasonable argumentation. Following this approach, the ad hominem argument is viewed as fallacious specifically because it violates fundamental procedural norms of rational arguments and not solely because it violates a particular norm or logical rule (as in normative theories).}

^{Recently, pragma-dialectics has incorporated elements from rhetoric into experimental analysis of ad hominem argument (van Eemeren et al., 2012). In particular, the authors have raised questions regarding the nature of “strategic maneuvering” from a pragma-dialectical perspective. “Strategic maneuvering” uses “the opportunities available in the dialectical situation for steering the discourse rhetorically in the direction that serves their own interest best” (p. 151). Thus, strategic maneuvering enables the parties to maintain the persuasiveness in the discussion without neglecting the standards of the argumentation. T}his approach has been studied recently in the cognitive field of argumentative structures such as the ad hominem argument (van Eemeren et al., 2012) and the straw men fallacy (Lewiński and Oswald, 2013).

 

 

One  time  some guy actually read  it and and responded to   it !     

 

Edited August 11, 2021 by Nungali

[Nungali]

17 hours ago, dwai said:

Aw stop ripping on that poor man…I feel bad for him. He has a brilliant mind (maybe too brilliant)…I hope he’s doing okay. 

 

 

Spoiler

 

[Nungali]

< oooops , double post >

Edited August 11, 2021 by Nungali

[forestofemptiness]

6 hours ago, Apech said:

I find it interesting - and quite amusing - that those 'systems' which claim non-conceptuality end up, in order to elaborate their claims highly conceptualised and disputational around terms.

 

It is a balance: too many concepts and people get mired in thought; not enough and people lack direction. I always struggled with Zen, which seemed to assume that one could cease conceptualizing just as one can choose to no longer wear red clothing. Tibetan Buddhism often has the opposite problem. 

 

6 hours ago, Apech said:

For me these days, only 'systems' which have a great work such as the creation of the diamond body, the immortal foetus etc. have any validity.

 

What do you mean? 

 

6 hours ago, Apech said:

Unpopular Opinion : Realising consciousness in a neo-advaitan sense is pure garbage.  Discuss!

 

It is a start, but certainly not an end in my mind. 

 

6 hours ago, Creation said:

But their writings don't seem to point to it explicitly. 

 

Well, they do, but writings are only part of the story. A lot of the tradition is oral. The writings usually provide a framework or the bones of the teaching. But the oral teachings keep it alive and fresh. In addition, there are different teachings for people at different levels. 

 

 

[dwai]

6 hours ago, Creation said:

Ah, this is an excellent point for discussion.  So, the "sudden awakening" schools of Buddhism I am familiar with would agree with you on this.  I even have seen xabir2005 and his teacher Thusness say this same thing on their blog.  So what is the disagreement?  What it is that is let go of in this process of dropping conditioning and unfolding clarity. 

Imagine a spider that has spun its web. And then it gets temporary amnesia that it is the spider, and it gets stuck in its own web. It stays stuck in that same web for a long time until it realizes that it is the one that had spun the web, and the web doesn't affect it in any way. The unfolding/dropping of conditioning can be akin to the spider re-discovering how to navigate the web, until it can pull it all back into itself one day. 

In terms of realization, there is no "other", but the appearance of a personality, veiling true nature from itself, has gathered tendencies to perpetuate this veiling, and it takes time for those tendencies to go away for most. There is no "new" realization, only a dissolution of those tendencies (called vasanas).  

 

(now don't get technically pedantic about this example -- it is simply to make a point)

 

6 hours ago, Creation said:

 

Even in Advaita there is not total agreement on this - there are two schools, Ajatavada and ... the one that's not Ajatavada, don't remember it's name .  I'm only familiar with the presentation of arising in Sri Atmananda's Direct Path, not Traditional Vedanta.  But the impression I get is that in terms of the difference in unfolding of this clarity, in Ajatavada even the very concept of arising is eventually let go of, whereas in the other school of Advaita it isn't.  This is a really subtle thing, so it's not too different.  But it seems to me that the clarity of someone with full realization in the Ajatavada school has developed a little further than someone in the other school. 

There are actually three, though won't technically call them schools per se --

1. Srishti-Dristhi Vada (this is the normal person mired in maya/samsara)

2. Dristhi-srishti vada (this is the seeker who is still in the process of purification)

3. Ajata vada (this is one who is fully established in Self-realization -- all vasanas have fallen away). 

 

6 hours ago, Creation said:

 

If someone had that first awakening to pure consciousness, but no one ever pointed out to them that the clarity can unfold further until subject-object duality has been dropped, they would be very unlikely to ever realize that on their own.  The awesomeness of pure consciousness is too convincing.  Actually, someone could point that out to them, and they might say, "No way, that sounds totally crazy, how could this limited body-mind which I have realized is not my true self be non-dual be from the infinite pure consciousness that I have realized is my True Self?" if they hadn't already accepted Advaita philosophy as authoritative.  Similarly, if no one ever pointed out that even the very subtle remaining sense of something arising could be dropped, that person would be very unlikely to figure it out on their own.  Hence the value of both subtle pointers and being open to them. 

Realization is not like that. Rather, realization is -- "I am awareness itself, and this body-mind-personality is an appearance in me...as is the world that I perceive".

 

Though there is something to said about the teachings that clarify this position, they are considered indirect knowledge until the realization occurs.

 

Think of it this way -- where does the realization happen? In the mind. The mind is just a phenomenon that is reflecting pure awareness.  Through the action of the four parts/faculties that make up what in English is called the "mind",  it appropriates labels for itself. So it says, "I am a person,  this and that is mine, and so on". It appropriates the sense of doer-ship..."I do this, I do that...and so on". It experiences the consequences of this apparent doership..."This is good (pleasant), that is bad (unpleasant)...I am happy, I am sad". It then suffers as it resists changes in the state of "clinging to the good" and "aversion to the bad".

 

So it is only the mind that awakens, and it is only the mind that drops its tendencies. Realization gives us the knowledge that the mind is simply a process/activity that appears in True Nature (Self/Atman/Brahman/etc). So even though the mind will, in course of time, release its tendencies -- the permanent shift of perspective of recognition as True Nature never changes. Like clouds appear and disappear in the sky, so do all happenings/phenomena. 

6 hours ago, Creation said:

 

So, as you know, sudden awakening schools of Mahayana Buddhism agree with Advaita that the unfolding of clarity eventually leads to the dropping of duality entirely.  In this case it's a bit arbitrary if you call the remaining non-dual experience true self or no self, because there is no longer any separation between self and other.  Hence the idea that Advaita and Buddhism are pointing to the same thing from the positive and negative directions, respectively.

Do you know what triggered the Buddhabum wars in the first place? It was my statement that Advaita Vedanta and Buddhism (and Daoism) point to the same Truth -- same realization. 

6 hours ago, Creation said:

But it can seem that even in this non-dual clarity, consciousness is still primary to the illusory objects that are ultimately non-dual from it.  As far as I can distill down the essence of what xabir2005 and Vajrahridaya were saying, they claim the process of unfolding of clarity and dropping of conditioning can proceed even further so that this very subtle duality implied by the primacy of consciousness to name-and-form is dropped.  In this case, calling the remaining non-dual consciousness "true self" makes even less sense, hence the preference for the description as "no-self". 

Why do Hindus call this "non-dual consciousness" Atman/Self? It is because there is nothing more intimate than it -- it is existence itself. Is there any such thing as "non-existence" -- can it ever/even be known? It can't. People can choose to call it whatever they like -- impersonal absolute Alaya Vijnana, Dao, Brahman, Atman -- it doesn't change the fact that this pure awareness is being itself.  There is no such thing as "non-being". 

 

*and then ducking the brickbats from the daoists*

6 hours ago, Creation said:

Once I understood what they were saying in this way, I was perfectly happy to accept that that was indeed possible.  To address @forestofemptiness's concerns, I have no idea if Ramana, Shankara, etc. had realized this or not.  I'm not claiming they hadn't.  But their writings don't seem to point to it explicitly.  Then again, the writings of many great Buddhist masters don't point to it explicitly either.  Again, I personally value the guidance of people who can address all these subtle dualistic attachments in detail.  But I also value the guidance of of people who powerfully point to initial realization of intrinsic clarity!  (And people who powerfully transmit deep samadhi, great moral character, etc.)  Simply knowing what is out there is often the first step in moving towards it, hence my posting about it. 

There is a reason why this is not spoon-fed. Because it is a realization. It needs to arise on its own after the indirect knowledge has been assimilated and the mind can free itself from its imaginary prison. 

[dwai]

7 hours ago, Apech said:

For me these days, only 'systems' which have a great work such as the creation of the diamond body, the immortal foetus etc. have any validity.

Ah the allure of becoming immortal and maintaining doership  

[Apech]

14 minutes ago, forestofemptiness said:

 

What do you mean? 

 

 

 

I mean that the idea that the end point of spiritual development is just realising 'consciousness' in some sense or other is not correct.