S:C

Interpretational inconsistencies? Clarification help, please!

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So the Commentary’s explanation of the first category of discourse—that discourses whose meaning needs to be inferred can be equated with teachings expressed in conventional truths—is not borne out by the evidence in the Canon. And what’s especially notable is that in these, and in all other cases of this sort, the explanations giving the meaning to be inferred never say that self, beings, or persons do not exist.

 

As for the second category—discourses whose meaning should not be drawn out any further—two examples stand out: In MN 136, a monk is asked, in personal terms, what one experiences after having performed an intentional action, and he responds that one experiences stress. The Buddha later rebukes him, but another monk comes to the first monk’s defense: Perhaps he was thinking of the impersonal teaching, “Whatever is felt comes under stress.” The Buddha rebukes this second monk, too, saying that when asked about the results of action, one is being asked about the three kinds of feeling—pleasant, painful, and neither—and so should respond as follows:

 

“‘Having intentionally done—with body, with speech, or with mind—an action that is to be felt as pleasure, one experiences pleasure. Having intentionally done—with body, with speech, or with mind—an action that is to be felt as pain, one experiences pain. Having intentionally done—with body, with speech, or with mind—an action that is to be felt as neither-pleasure-nor-pain, one experiences neither-pleasure-nor-pain.’” — MN 136

 

Taking the second monk’s words as an explanation of the first monk’s words, it would count as a passage expressed in personal terms whose meaning is wrongly drawn out in impersonal terms. This means that the Buddha’s warning about wrongly drawing out the meaning of a discourse does not apply only to attempts to translate impersonal language into personal language. Other considerations—such as whether a teaching is appropriate to a particular context or purpose (attha)—can also play a determining role. Statements have to be judged not only as descriptive, but also as performative: what they induce the listener to do. If a person is told that all action leads to stress, that person will feel no reason to put forth the effort to act skillfully rather than unskillfully. This would get in the way of his making progress on the path.

https://www.dhammatalks.org/books/Mirror_ofInsight/Section0005.html follow up question on the neighboring thread about the two truth doctrine text

The bolded and italicized parts of this text from dhammatalks are only interpretational source and not primary canonical source? 
 

Else, the question would be: who is doing the weighing / inducing / inferring / judging / considering of appropriation on the matters at hand? It would be a personal discourse about an impersonal discourse matter, no? Meaning can only be inferred in the personal language? So the interpreter did believe that the Buddha accepted personal valuations in the impersonal discourse? Else how could something be ‘wrong’ or ‘inappropriate’ in the impersonal discourse? 
Did the Buddha believe that objective valuations exist, was he a metaethical cognitivist? Or did his ‘state’ transcend personality in that way that his statements are interpreted (by his followers) as impersonal still, even though uttered and evaluated through his process of sense features (non-being, as not grasping, but still physically alive).

How can it be decidedly known if the first or second monk really did use an impersonal interpretation of a personal statement. 
Where does the objectivity come from suddenly? Who is doing the evaluation? 

 

Does anyone else see the contradiction (of the interpretation), or am I missing something? Should I reformulate for more clarity? - I’d like to invite @Taoist Texts , @stirling and @Mark Foote and whoever else feels concerned, @Apech (because the weighing of the feather in the Khonsu Mes thread by Ma’at comes to mind?) 

Edited by S:C

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“This means that the Buddha’s warning about wrongly drawing out the meaning of a discourse does not apply only to attempts to translate impersonal language into personal language.”

 

That is supposed to say, that just because first monk and second monk evaluate their sense data as stressful, they are not supposed to state this in an impersonal way, as this is or could be influencing others, who might not come to this conclusion. 
 

Other considerations—such as whether a teaching is appropriate to a particular context or purpose (attha)—can also play a determining role.” 
 

How and who determines what is appropriate? Is that determination impersonal or personal?

Did the Buddha believe in free will or determinism?

 

“Statements have to be judged not only as descriptive, but also as performative: what they induce the listener to do.” 

 

Did he really believe in the normative / inductive / performative aspect of statements? If so, was this an impersonal or a personal teaching?



Isn’t making that evaluation of weighing (do’s and don’ts / causation) in itself something that strains the senses and proves a point here? 
 

Doesn’t evaluation always rely on the personal sense data? What is it that evaluates when there is none of those?

 


 

Disagreements, corrections and interpretation welcome.

 

So sad to see so many contradictions in my own questions, sorry. :( 

Edited by S:C

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It sounds like you are a little tangled up. Rather than attempt to untangle you, do you mind if I ask what it is you want from Buddhism in general, or (perhaps in a single simplified statement) what it is you are trying to understand in particular from this set of teachings?

 

I *think* a lot of your questions could be answered with a little perspective about enlightened understanding vs. conventional intellectual knowledge, and or an explanation of "skillful means" as a whole. 

 

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3 hours ago, S:C said:

Does anyone else see the contradiction

 

I haven't read through the particular question you're asking about, but, in general, yes.  I've noticed significant contradictions in Buddhism.

 

Edit to add: perhaps it's good to be prepared for the inevitable "It can't be understood by you, because you're not enlightened."

 

Edited by Daniel
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6 hours ago, S:C said:

 

The bolded and italicized parts of this text from dhammatalks are only interpretational source and not primary canonical source? 

 

Does anyone else see the contradiction (of the interpretation), or am I missing something? Should I reformulate for more clarity? - I’d like to invite @Taoist Texts , @stirling and @Mark Foote and whoever else feels concerned, @Apech (because the weighing of the feather in the Khonsu Mes thread by Ma’at comes to mind?) 

 


Checking the article you quote from ("Two Truths?", by Thanissaro Bhikkhu), he sets up his argument with quotes from commentaries to the sermons, and with quotes from the fifth Nikaya.  I don't see that he cites the source of the commentaries--Buddhaghosa, maybe?  I myself take everything Buddhaghosa says with more than a grain of salt.  The fifth Nikaya is a volume of later composition, according to A. K. Warder in "Buddhist India" and I believe other scholars. 

Myself, I avoid even quoting sermons in the first four Nikayas that are not attributed to Gautama himself--the voices of the disciples, like that of Sariputta the foremost disciple, are subtly different from the voice of Gautama, and I find their understanding admits of things that Gautama's understanding did not .

I looked to find this passage:

 

“‘Having intentionally done—with body, with speech, or with mind—an action that is to be felt as pleasure, one experiences pleasure. Having intentionally done—with body, with speech, or with mind—an action that is to be felt as pain, one experiences pain. Having intentionally done—with body, with speech, or with mind—an action that is to be felt as neither-pleasure-nor-pain, one experiences neither-pleasure-nor-pain.’” — MN 136

 

 

There are three volumes of the Majjhima Nikaya (MN).  I looked up 136 in all three, since Thanissaro didn't specify which volume, and I could not find anything resembling what he quoted above.  Strange.

I would advise you to stick with the sermons spoken by Gautama in the first four Nikayas.  I think I was careful in setting out the fundamentals of his teaching in A Way of Living.  How those fundamentals play out in real time for me, I hope I captured in Shunryu Suzuki on Shikantaza and the Theravadin Stages.

I bought a set of the first four Nikayas in the 1980's.  You can read them online here, but I think it's better to have them in hand.  If you can only afford a few, MN III and SN V have some amazing things in them.  I skimmed a lot of sermons, and studied some--maybe every 12th sermon was interesting, to me, and the Pali Text Society translators summarized and eliminated a lot of the repetition, at that. 

I took notes, they're here.

 

I know that Gautama said there was no closed fist of the teacher in his own case, that he taught both the esoteric and the exoteric, and I think that flies in the face of any "two truths" theory:

 

 

Thus spoke the Venerable Ananda, but the Blessed One answered him, saying: "What more does the community of bhikkhus expect from me, Ananda? I have set forth the Dhamma without making any distinction of esoteric and exoteric doctrine; there is nothing, Ananda, with regard to the teachings that the Tathagata holds to the last with the closed fist of a teacher who keeps some things back.

 

(DN 16 PTS: D ii 72 chapters 1-6; Maha-parinibbana Sutta: Last Days of the Buddha tr Sister Vajira & Francis Story)

 

 

 

Edited by Mark Foote
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6 hours ago, S:C said:

I’d like to invite @Taoist Texts

thanks. to me the article is false. Not only there is no such things as 'two truths'  in Buddha's teaching...but also the author does not understand that the 'two truths' as fabricated by the later buddhists refer to samsara and nirvana states of mind, not to terminology or rhetoric: https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/twotruths-india/

As to your questions, they are unclear to me (sorry), and also they are extraneous to what is actually said in the sutras. IMHO you would be better off asking what is it exactly Buddha says, not what the article's author says about what the Buddha says, because the author does not understand buddhism.

6 hours ago, S:C said:

Did the Buddha believe in free will or determinism?

this single question is clear to me so i can answer it.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Free_will

Of course there is no free will in buddhism first of all because the western free wil is a fiction. Second, in buddhism there can be no 'will' produced by a samsaric mind because such mind does not exist on its own so it does not have a will of its own. And finally in buddhism can be no 'will' in the nirvanic mind because a will is a desire and such mind is free of desires.

 

;)

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19 hours ago, S:C said:

@Apech (because the weighing of the feather in the Khonsu Mes thread by Ma’at comes to mind?) 

 

Firstly @Taoist Texts is right (not something I admit without some pain) that there are no Two Truths in the original recorded saying of the Buddha.  And for @Daniel who sees contradictions in Buddhism - some arise because in terms of the philosophy (or as they would call it 'the view') there are many in different schools of Buddhism which actually don't agree.  Some are later developments or refinements of others and others are simply differing statements about what is true.  All Buddhists may agree about say the truth of suffering and wotnot - but when it comes to developing philosophical models about what is real and what is not we have 2,500 years of dispute.  In Tibet monasteries were sacked or forcibly converted for following different interpretations.  All is not sweetness and light in the Buddhist world and neither is it a bland mediocrity that everyone signs up to without thought.

 

The weighing of the feather in Khonsu-mes pre-dates Buddha by about 1000 years (give or take) and comes (obviously) from a different cultural base.  Having said that - in Egyptian mythology there is a 'Hall of Two Truths' which is kind of interesting.  The feather - in this case the feather of Ma'at is the order which the sun creates every day.  The world created by the sun is like a bubble in an infinite watery chaotic vastness.  So the tendency (as with the scientific concept of entropy) is that if left alone the chaotic energies of this vastness will penetrate the bubble and distort the world in bad ways.  That is why you get droughts and floods and so on - because Ma'at has been lost.  It was the role of the Sun to continually fight this tendency and re-establish right order.  So too the King or pharaoh was charged to maintain Ma'at in the land.  On a personal level therefore there is a way of living in accordance with ma'at and there are things that might be done which disturb ma'at.  So not doing wrong things is the key (I gave a handy list in the Khonsu-mes thread).  This could easily be compared to 'right living' in Buddhism.  And the list of the negative confession is quite obviously an ancestor of the Ten Commandments in the Bible.

 

I'm not sure if this answers anything you asked or not.  

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Buddhists have a hard enough time understanding Buddhism, so what chance do non-Buddhists like me have?  Not much.  Nevertheless, I'll take a stab at elucidating the two-truths doctrine: right thinking is inherently shrouded in paradox and it's time for breakfast.

Edited by liminal_luke
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14 hours ago, liminal_luke said:

right thinking is inherently shrouded in paradox and it's time for breakfast.

That sounds just right - for now. I do skip breakfast these days, it’s a bad habit of ‘entangled mind’, this stuff is just too personal and thus I will restrain myself from asking what is “right” thinking for you, definitory.

I will try to answer open questions (hopefully) later with a calmer mind, until so far, thanks at all for participating here. 

Edited by S:C
Self restraint
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6 hours ago, S:C said:

That sounds just right - for now. I do skip breakfast these days, it’s a bad habit of ‘entangled mind’, this stuff is just too personal and thus I will restrain myself from asking what is “right” thinking for you, definitory.

I will try to answer open questions (hopefully) later with a calmer mind, until so far, thanks at all for participating here. 

 

Speaking for myself, "calm" comes from the heart, not the mind.  And while both are part of the psyche, they operate in different ways.  

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On 11/7/2023 at 8:24 PM, Taoist Texts said:


... the author does not understand buddhism.

 



The source of S.C.'s quotation:

 

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Thanissaro Bhikkhu (Geoffrey DeGraff) is an American Buddhist monk of the Kammatthana (Thai Forest) Tradition. After graduating from Oberlin College in 1971 with a degree in European Intellectual History, he traveled to Thailand, where he studied meditation under Ajaan Fuang Jotiko, himself a student of the late Ajaan Lee. He ordained in 1976 and lived at Wat Dhammasathit, where he remained following his teacher's death in 1986. In 1991 he traveled to the hills of San Diego County, USA, where he helped Ajaan Suwat Suvaco establish Metta Forest Monastery (Wat Mettavanaram). He was made abbot of the Monastery in 1993.

 

 

Thanissaro Bhikku wrote:

 

Emptiness as a quality of dharmas, in the early canons, means simply that one cannot identify them as one’s own self or having anything pertaining to one’s own self… Emptiness as a mental state, in the early canons, means a mode of perception in which one neither adds anything to nor takes anything away from what is present, noting simply, “There is this.” This mode is achieved through a process of intense concentration, coupled with the insight that notes more and more subtle levels of the presence and absence of disturbance.

 

(Wikipedia, “Sunyata” entry as of Sept. 19, 2020)

 

 

I think from that I can surmise that his practice is "noting", as practiced by some teachers in Thailand and celebrated in the USA as a practice synonymous with mindfulness.  Satipatthana is often cited as a source, when the practice is attributed to Gautama the Buddha.

 

I confess, I think of "noting" practice in America as the reason for the term "McMindfulness".  

I've also read something fromThanissaro on "one-pointedness" or "one-pointedness of mind", which Gautama equated with concentration.  My conclusion was, that Thanissaro did not know what "one-pointedness of mind" was.  Of course, I have the presumption to assume I do!

 

Edited by Mark Foote
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3 hours ago, Mark Foote said:

I think of "noting" practice in America as the reason for the term "McMindfulness".  
  Thanissaro did not know what "one-pointedness of mind" was.

yes unfortunately its par for the course. i cannot think of a single concept that the professional western buddhists or taoists got right

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12 hours ago, Taoist Texts said:


i cannot think of a single concept that the professional western buddhists or taoists got right
 

 

 

“One-pointedness of mind” was apparently a commonly understood phrase in Gautama’s day. Such phrases can be difficult to translate, according to I. B. Horner, the Pali Text Society translator of the Middle-Length Sayings:
 

This is an example of the allusiveness of the Pali texts.  It does not detract from their precision, but only shows it is we who must find the key to what at one time was probably obvious and well understood.
 

(“Translator’s Introduction”, Pali Text Society MN III p xxi)

 

 

(excerpt from Not the Wind, Not the Flag)

 

 

 

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10 hours ago, Mark Foote said:

“One-pointedness of mind” was apparently a commonly understood phrase in Gautama’s day.

probably it was 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ekaggata

 

But:

1 apparently it is not a term ever used by Buddha. It is a later addition to the buddhist nomenclature  from hinduism or such

2 all the profi  westerners make it to mean a concentration on an object (the titular 'point') - but it is not that. Rather it means a unified mind, oneness of the mind, nothing to do with objects. Eka means one. so  Ekaggata just means oneness.

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1 hour ago, Taoist Texts said:

probably it was 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ekaggata

 

But:

1 apparently it is not a term ever used by Buddha. It is a later addition to the buddhist nomenclature  from hinduism or such

2 all the profi  westerners make it to mean a concentration on an object (the titular 'point') - but it is not that. Rather it means a unified mind, oneness of the mind, nothing to do with objects. Eka means one. so  Ekaggata just means oneness.


if thy eye be single then your whole body also will be filled with light

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11 hours ago, Taoist Texts said:

 

Quote

 

 21 hours ago, Mark Foote said:

“One-pointedness of mind” was apparently a commonly understood phrase in Gautama’s day.

 

 


probably it was 

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ekaggata

 

But:

1 apparently it is not a term ever used by Buddha. It is a later addition to the buddhist nomenclature  from hinduism or such

2 all the profi  westerners make it to mean a concentration on an object (the titular 'point') - but it is not that. Rather it means a unified mind, oneness of the mind, nothing to do with objects. Eka means one. so  Ekaggata just means oneness.
 



I couldn't agree with you more, with regard to your second point.  Here's Zen teacher koun Franz making the distinction:


The phrase appears in too many places in the first four Nikayas for me to agree with you, that it was not used by Gautama.  Moreover, Okay… So, have your hands in the cosmic mudra, palms up, thumbs touching, and there’s this common instruction: place your mind here. Different people interpret this differently. Some people will say this means to place your attention here, meaning to keep your attention on your hands. It’s a way of turning the lens to where you are in space so that you’re not looking out here and out here and out here. It’s the positive version, perhaps, of ‘navel gazing’.

The other way to understand this is to literally place your mind where your hands are–to relocate mind (let’s not say your mind) to your centre of gravity, so that mind is operating from a place other than your brain. Some traditions take this very seriously, this idea of moving your consciousness around the body. I wouldn’t recommend dedicating your life to it, but as an experiment, I recommend trying it, sitting in this posture and trying to feel what it’s like to let your mind, to let the base of your consciousness, move away from your head. One thing you’ll find, or that I have found, at least, is that you can’t will it to happen, because you’re willing it from your head. To the extent that you can do it, it’s an act of letting go–and a fascinating one.

(“No Struggle [Zazen Yojinki, Part 6]”, by Koun Franz, from the “Nyoho Zen” site)

 

I have to disagree, with your first point, and I'm curious how you came to that conclusion.  "One-pointedness" appears in sermons credited to Gautama in each of the first four Nikayas, as far as I know.  Some examples:

 

“And what… is the (noble) right concentration with the causal associations, with the accompaniments?  It is right view, right purpose, right speech, right action, right mode of livelihood, right endeavor, right mindfulness.  Whatever one-pointedness of mind is accompanied by these seven components , this… is called the (noble) right concentration with the causal associations and the accompaniments.”
 

(MN III 71, Pali Text Society vol III p 114; similar at SN V 17; “noble” substituted for Ariyan)

 

 

Herein… the (noble) disciple, making self-surrender the object of (their) thought, lays hold of concentration, lays hold of one-pointedness.  (The disciple), aloof from sensuality, aloof from evil conditions, enters on the first trance, which is accompanied by thought directed and sustained, which is born of solitude, easeful and zestful, and abides therein.
 

(SN v 198, Pali Text Society vol V p 174; parenthetical material paraphrases original; “directed” also rendered as “initial” MN III p 78 and as “applied” PTS AN III p 18-19)

 

 

Some of my own writing on the subject:

 

Foyan spoke of “looking for a donkey riding on the donkey”.  The degree of “self-surrender” required to allow necessity to place attention, and the presence of mind required to “lay hold” as the placement of attention shifts, make the conscious experience of “riding the donkey” elusive. Suzuki provided an analogy:
 

If you are going to fall, you know, from, for instance, from the tree to the ground, the moment you, you know, leave the branch you lose your function of the body. But if you don’t, you know, there is a pretty long time before you reach to the ground. And there may be some branch, you know. So you can catch the branch or you can do something. But because you lose function of your body, you know [laughs], before you reach to the ground, you may lose your conscious[ness].
 

(“To Actually Practice Selflessness”, August Sesshin Lecture Wednesday, August 6, 1969, San Francisco; “fell” corrected to “fall”; transcript from shunryusuzuki.com)
 

Suzuki offered the analogy in response to the travails of his students, who were experiencing pain in their legs sitting cross-legged on the floor.  In his analogy, he suggested the possibility of an escape from pain through a presence of mind with the function of the body.
 

The difficulty is that most people will lose consciousness before they cede activity to the location of attention–they lose the presence of mind with the placement of attention, because they can’t believe that action in the body is possible without “doing something”:
 

It’s impossible to teach the meaning of sitting. You won’t believe it. Not because I say something wrong, but until you experience it and confirm it by yourself, you cannot believe it.
 

(Kobun Chino Otogawa, “Embracing Mind”, edited by Cosgrove & Hall, pg 48)
 

As I’ve written previously, there’s an opportunity to make self-surrender the object of thought and to lay hold of “one-pointedness” just before falling asleep:
 

… Just before I fall asleep, my awareness can move very readily, and my sense of where I am tends to move with it. This is also true when I am waking up, although it can be harder to recognize (I tend to live through my eyes in the daytime, and associate my sense of place with them).
 

… when I realize my physical sense of location in space, and realize it as it occurs from one moment to the next, then I wake up or fall asleep as appropriate.
 

(Waking Up and Falling Asleep)

 

 

(Shunryu Suzuki on Shikantaza and the Theravadin Stages)


 

Edited by Mark Foote

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1 hour ago, Mark Foote said:

I have to disagree, with your first point, and I'm curious how you came to that conclusion.  "One-pointedness" appears in sermons credited to Gautama in each of the first four Nikayas, as far as I know.  Some examples:

 

“And what… is the (noble) right concentration with the causal associations, with the accompaniments?  It is right view, right purpose, right speech, right action, right mode of livelihood, right endeavor, right mindfulness.  Whatever one-pointedness of mind is accompanied by these seven components , this… is called the (noble) right concentration with the causal associations and the accompaniments.”
 

(MN III 71, Pali Text Society vol III p 114; similar at SN V 17; “noble” substituted for Ariyan)

 

you quote this

MAHACATTA

while ekaggatā is indeed mentioned there but just one single time. With the big deal made out of ekaggatā  by the later buddhists, one would think Buddha would mention it at least 2 or 3 times in a sutra. But no, just one time at the description of the very first stage, as if by accident.. Thats why i think it is a later insertion.

(also you may note the meaning of ekaggatta in this translation differs from the usual  ' one-pointedness': "Unification of mind with these seven factors as prerequisites", thats why i said that Buddha even if he would use this word, might used it in a different sense than the usual " one-pointedness of the mind on an object or on itself".)

 

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22 hours ago, Taoist Texts said:

ekaggatā (…) 

you quote this

MAHACATTA

might be the paradigm shift - and the ‚usual one pointedness‘ might come through conscious stepping back or letting go (just as @Mark Foote knows how to describe so eloquently) , so how the paradigm shift might have been set in motion can be debated but not verified?


another point connected to the non-dual misnoming in the other thread concerns the ‚right‘ view question (I had hoped I could restrain myself from expanding further on it, but no): 

 

isn‘t that connected to what @Apech structured up there in the nondual misnomer thread so coherently? the linked sutra talks about ‚right with defilements‘, ‚noble right‘ (so without defilements) and wrong. the right without defilements could maybe be a ‚right of a higher logical order‘, as explained by the Zhentong Madhyamika, a ‚right’ without contradictions, - Nargajunas absolute negation might ring a bell here to.
at some point of evaluation (in the right with defilements view) sense data view and right interpretational view and following that the consequences for (right) deed or refraining from that lets you maybe (?) always (?) end up at a contradiction, stalemate or an impasse in your evaluation if you dig deep enough. Thus … there is a right without defilements (or contradictions), but how to get closer… well who knows, could be purely hypothetical, but logically wouldn’t need to be, - could be ‚real‘? Something that touches upon this somewhere in the texts?

It could also shine a bit of light on the controversy among the branches of Buddhism, if and when lying can be considered appropriate, if I ain’t mistaken, please correct me if I am…

Edited by S:C
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1 hour ago, S:C said:

debated but not verified?

there are no facts in this samsaric world of ours, only opinions

1 hour ago, S:C said:

if and when lying can be considered appropriate

Hagakure    Walk with a real man one hundred yards and he'll tell you at least seven lies.

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On 11/11/2023 at 2:15 PM, Taoist Texts said:

you quote this

MAHACATTA

while ekaggatā is indeed mentioned there but just one single time. With the big deal made out of ekaggatā  by the later buddhists, one would think Buddha would mention it at least 2 or 3 times in a sutra. But no, just one time at the description of the very first stage, as if by accident.. Thats why i think it is a later insertion.

(also you may note the meaning of ekaggatta in this translation differs from the usual  ' one-pointedness': "Unification of mind with these seven factors as prerequisites", thats why i said that Buddha even if he would use this word, might used it in a different sense than the usual " one-pointedness of the mind on an object or on itself".)

 


I've picked up SN V, looked in the index under "concentration", and found:
 

And what... is right concentration?... By the calming down of thought directed and sustained, (one)enters on that inward calm, that one-pointedness of mind, apart from thought directed and sustained, that is born of mental balance, zestful and easeful, that is the second trance.

 

(SN V 9, Pali Text Society V p 9, parenthetical paraphrases original)

 

 

And what... is the (noble) right concentration which is associated and equipped?  It is (associated with) right view, right aim, right speech, right action, right living, right effort, right mindfulness and right concentration.

Now... the one-pointedness of mind which is equipped with these seven limbs is called "the (noble) right concentration on which is assoicated, likewise which is equipped.

(SN V 17, Pali Text Society V p 19, parentheticals paraphrases original)

 

 

Come ye, friends, do ye abide in body contemplating body [as transient], ardent, composed and one-pointed, of tranquil mind, calmed down, of concentrated mind, for insight into body as it really is. 

(similarly for feelings, mind, and mental states; SN V 144, PTS p 123, bracketed material in original)

 

 

If he should desire:  By the calming down of thought directed and sustained, entering on that inward calm, that one--pointedness of mind apart from thought directed and sustained, that is born of mental balance, zestful and easeful, which is the second trance, may I abide therein--he must do likewise (give strict attention to the intent concentration on inbreathing and outbreathing).

 

(SN V 317, PTS p 281, parenthetical paraphrases original)

 

 

Very interesting, that here twice one-pointedness is associated with the second trance, rather than the first.  And yet, it's also associated with concentration, implying the first and all subsequent states of concentration (which is how I interpret it).

 

Now let's turn to MN III, another of my favorite volumes.  Here, I had to look at "meditation", "the four" in the index to find the references:

 

 

... by allaying initial thought and discursive thought, (one's) mind subjectively tranquillised and fixed on one point, enters and abides in the second meditation...

 

(MN II 226, PTS III 226 p 13; also at MN III 4 PTS III p 55, MN III 93 PTS III p 133, MN III 136 PTS p 182; parenthetical paraphrases original)

 

 

And those things which belong to the first meditation, initial thought and sustained thought and rapture and joy and one-pointedness of mind, impingement, feeling, perception, will, thought, desire, determination, energy, mindfulness, equanimity, attention, are uninterruptedly set up by him...

(MN III 25, PTS III p 78)

 

 

(One) attends to an inward [concept of] emptiness.  ... (One) attends to an external [concept of] emptiness.  (One) attends to an inward and to an external [concept of] emptiness.  (One) attends to imperturbability.... (One) should steady, calm, make one-pointed and concentrate (their) mind precisely on what is inward in that earlier sign of concentration itself....

(MN III 112, PTS III p 156; bracketed material in original; parenthetical paraphrases original)

 

 

Interesting.  I do agree with you that "mind subjectively tranquillised and fixed on one point" is a misrepresentation, unless it's understood that the one point can move.  Even then, I think the description is misleading, as the experience is more one of awareness as one point, mind as one point, rather than a glorified navel-gazing with the mind.

 

 

 

Edited by Mark Foote
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13 hours ago, S:C said:


Thus … there is a right without defilements (or contradictions), but how to get closer… well who knows, could be purely hypothetical, but logically wouldn’t need to be, - could be ‚real‘? Something that touches upon this somewhere in the texts?
 

 

 

As to this… right view comes first. And how… does right view come first? If one comprehends that wrong speech is wrong speech and comprehends that right speech is right speech, that is… right view. And what… is wrong speech? Lying, slanderous speech, harsh speech, and gossiping. This… is wrong speech. And what… is right speech? Now I… say that right speech is twofold. There is… the right speech that… ripens unto cleaving (to new birth). There is… the right speech that is… a component of the Way. And what… is the right speech that… ripens unto cleaving (to new birth)? Abstaining from lying, abstaining from slanderous speech… harsh speech… gossiping. This… is the right speech that… ripens unto cleaving (to new birth).

 

And what… is the right speech that is… a component of the Way? Whatever… is abstention from, refraining from, avoidance of, restraint from the four ways of bad speech in one who, by developing the [noble] Way is of [noble] thought, of cankerless thought, and is conversant with the Way–this… is right speech that is… a component of the Way.

((MN III 71-78, Vol III pg 113-121)
 

 

Similarly for some of the other "right" aspects of the eight-fold way, which becomes ten-fold for the adept, with the addition of "right knowledge" and "right freedom".

You can't get there from here.

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7 hours ago, Mark Foote said:

You can't get there from here.

What do you mean by this?

I don‘t think I understood.

No teacher can abstractly explain this?

Edited by S:C

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From another thread:

 

6 hours ago, Daniel said:

If Buddha is not teaching ontology ( did I understand that correctly? ) then, where is this assertion about reality coming from?  

 

"Reality is the mind of Buddha?"   <--- this is a truly bizarre assertion.  I'll skip that for now

Gautama wasn’t teaching ontology, too?! But how then could he teach morals? Isn’t ontology a step before? (Genuine interest, I am seriously startled at this statement.) 

Isn’t it possible to deduct what his metaethical and ontological perspective was through the canonical texts? 
Is there anyone I could ask this who has a well rounded knowledge on this subject/matter? 
 

[I am still trying to find answers on the questions of the first posters, it all seems bit of like an avalanche, sorry for the timely delay, might need a few days vacation to write that all out.]

Edited by S:C

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In my simple limited understanding of what the Buddha may have said his ontology was codependent origination (everything relational and impermanent). This was the key insight he had (not based on a philosophical reasoning) that allowed one to end the dissatisfactory outcomes associated with the inherently unstable design of their minds.I feel that everything else came out to serve this insight (behaviors, tools, etc)  I sense he consciously tried to avoid definitive deep philosophical opinions (like the existence of God) because he didn’t feel they helped people achieve what he thought was possible for them. He comes across to me as a practical person that saw the limited value and dissatisfactory outcomes associated with deep philosophical disputations and attachment to rigid opinions on topics, particularly given the inherent fluidity of reality.

 

 

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