The Art of War

[Michael Sternbach]

After reading Giles' notes to the chapter I would point out two things:

 

First, regarding the temple, Giles suggests that this is the General's tent.

 

Second, is the concept of practice.  In modern days we call this "war games".  All levels of the command practice their individual duties and responsibilities so that when the real thing happens we respond instinctively.  Without fear or question.  (The US Marines and Special Forces of all the Service branches operate at this level.)

 

In our everyday life we could call this having confidence in being able to accomplish the goals we undertake.

 

Or, more specifically, visualization for in preparation for tasks we want to be able to accomplish. A highly effective method. But it should be realized that it actually makes the scenarios that we visualize more likely to happen in the first place...

Edited August 6, 2015 by Michael Sternbach

[Michael Sternbach]

Ah!  Today's mentality.  We have to do everything "NOW".  No time for planning.  Just do it!  And we all have to get to where we are going as soon as possible.

 

Right. Even some spiritually conscious people tend to fall into that trap. So despite wu wei spontaneity, careful preparation can be in accordance with the Dao. Or better yet, spontaneous action based on preparation and planning.

 

I'm old fashioned.  I don't multitask.  But I still screw up sometimes.  Hehehe.

 

But sure, if we know what our capabilities and capacities are we can proceed with confidence because our planned actions will be within the realm of what we know we can do.  Of course, we can't always know what might happen exterior to us so we must remain flexible.

 

Ah!, that word "flexible".  One of my favorites.  In the TTC many translators use the word "weak" and I think that this is incorrect.  It are not the weak who survive; it are the flexible.

 

Indeed.

[Michael Sternbach]

Yeah, the more interpretations we have the better we can discuss the concepts.

 

Hehehe.

 

This is a heavy concept that even I have avoided speaking to.  I will give it a shot here.  (Refinement will likely be necessary.)

 

Oftentimes we see where it is said that Dao favors one over the other.  This is an error in the first part.  Reason:  we have personified Dao.  That, IMO, is a No, No.  Dao is not to be personified.  Christians personify Dao and call it God.

 

It is the De of Dao that (not who) determines who will win or lose.  So what is the De of Dao?  It is the natural way.  That is to say, the way of nature.  Nature never loses.  The natural way is always the way of nature.  The De of Dao are the processes of nature.

 

So, in fact, Dao has done nothing.  Dao has not determined who will win or who will lose.  It are we who determine win/lose based on whether we chose the Way of Dao or the way of man.

 

This is actually a brilliant definition. The question of winning is then one of dealing with the forces that are present in the best possible manner. However, I do think that people with constructive aims are often more capable of coordinating their actions with the Dao, therefore they have higher chances of success. And the scenarios most in tune with Dao are win-win ones, in my view.

 

Yes, now you include the concept of strength.  So we have two dualistic concepts now:  Flexible/rigid and Strong/weak.  In my mind it are the strong and flexible who win, not the weak and rigid.

 

I quite like your pairing of strong with flexible, and weak with rigid. In a sense, rigidity is strength that is one-sided and doesn't allow for its polar opposite, thus turns into weakness altogether eventually.

Edited August 6, 2015 by Michael Sternbach

[Marblehead]

Anyhow, great posts from everyone while I was out.  I'll check in the morning to see if there is anything else I want to speak to in regard to Chapter One.  (I'm becoming brain dead now.)

[Marblehead]

Yes, there is one more concept that is just as valid today as it was in Sun Tzu's days.  This would be:

 

17.  According as circumstances are favorable,  one should modify one's plans.

 

Giles notes this line very well so I will present the entire note:

 

[sun Tzu, as a practical soldier, will have none of the "bookish theoric."  He cautions us here not to pin our faith to abstract principles; "for," as Chang Yu puts it, "while the main laws of strategy can be stated clearly enough for the benefit of all and sundry, you must be guided by the actions of the enemy in attempting to secure a favorable position in actual warfare."  On the eve of the battle of Waterloo, Lord Uxbridge, commanding the cavalry, went to the Duke of Wellington in order to learn what his plans and calculations were for the morrow, because, as he explained, he might suddenly find himself Commander-in-chief and would be unable to frame new plans in a critical moment.  The Duke listened quietly and then said:  "Who will attack the first tomorrow -- I or Bonaparte?"  "Bonaparte," replied Lord Uxbridge.  "Well," continued the Duke, "Bonaparte has not given me any idea of his projects; and as my plans will depend upon his,  how can you expect me to tell you what mine are?"]  Ibid

 

Isn't this reminding us to remain flexible with our plans?

 

We know what our objective is.  We don't know how the rest of the world is going to react to those actions we undertake.  So we remain flexible with our plans so that we can still attain our objective.

[Marblehead]

I should follow your example!

Yes, just as the general must leave his tent on occasion to informally inspect his troops, check on logistics, and many other matters that could effect his grand mission.

[Marblehead]

Yeah... it's a funny one. Looking at any dictionary, ancient or modern, 弱 is listed as weak, infirm, delicate, feeble, young, soft.

As the opposite of  强 strong (not necessarily rigid), it often seems to make most sense to translate as weak (not necessarily flexible).

 

TTC 36:      柔弱勝剛強      soft weak overcome hard strong

Yep.  I have had this discussion many times before.  I can't argue the translations as I do not read Chinese.  All I can do is go on my personal experiences and my gut feelings.  Perhaps during Sun Tzu's time there were connotations attached to the Chinese word that have long been forgotten?

[Marblehead]

 Or better yet, spontaneous action based on preparation and planning.

Yes, that's good.  And really, that's how I prefer to live my life.

[Marblehead]

 However, I do think that people with constructive aims are often more capable of coordinating their actions with the Dao, therefore they have higher chances of success. And the scenarios most in tune with Dao are win-win ones, in my view.

I agree with this if we don't consider exceptions like Genghis Khan and Hitler.

 

I quite like your pairing of strong with flexible, and weak with rigid. In a sense, rigidity is strength that is one-sided and doesn't allow for its polar opposite, thus turns into weakness altogether eventually.

My experiences in life led me to this understanding.  I know that some do not agree with me and all I can do is acknowledge that lack of agreement.

[Michael Sternbach]

Yes, there is one more concept that is just as valid today as it was in Sun Tzu's days.  This would be:

 

17.  According as circumstances are favorable,  one should modify one's plans.

 

Giles notes this line very well so I will present the entire note:

 

[sun Tzu, as a practical soldier, will have none of the "bookish theoric."  He cautions us here not to pin our faith to abstract principles; "for," as Chang Yu puts it, "while the main laws of strategy can be stated clearly enough for the benefit of all and sundry, you must be guided by the actions of the enemy in attempting to secure a favorable position in actual warfare."  On the eve of the battle of Waterloo, Lord Uxbridge, commanding the cavalry, went to the Duke of Wellington in order to learn what his plans and calculations were for the morrow, because, as he explained, he might suddenly find himself Commander-in-chief and would be unable to frame new plans in a critical moment.  The Duke listened quietly and then said:  "Who will attack the first tomorrow -- I or Bonaparte?"  "Bonaparte," replied Lord Uxbridge.  "Well," continued the Duke, "Bonaparte has not given me any idea of his projects; and as my plans will depend upon his,  how can you expect me to tell you what mine are?"]  Ibid

 

Isn't this reminding us to remain flexible with our plans?

 

We know what our objective is.  We don't know how the rest of the world is going to react to those actions we undertake.  So we remain flexible with our plans so that we can still attain our objective.

 

Right. No plan is more important than the purpose it serves. I think of plans as approximate outlines, to be held on to, implemented, modified, extended according to circumstances. A good going can even supersede the original plan - if you remain open.

[woodcarver]

I'd like to become at least somewhat familiar with the text, and I'd be happy to look at the Chinese when necessary (though I realize nobody's looking for long translation discussions). Not having had the energy to get deep into the LZ or ZZ recently, I think SZ might offer some relatively 'light' study...

 

Though I know very little about the text so far, I've had a look here, and it would seem that the Giles, Gagliardi, and Ames translations all get the point across pretty well... though my preferred translation style is almost certainly found here; it is perhaps slightly less elegant than some, but seems much closer to the Chinese than any of the others.

 

As Giles's is on ctext, it offers easy comparison with Chinese; if I end up contributing further, I'd probably suggest using a combination of Giles and the Sonshi version (loyal, to the point, and also available for free online).

That's more practical than typing and I will always side with accuracy.

 

The organization Tai Chi World, founded by Erle Montaigue and continued by his son Eli, offers excellent, very detailed training videos that I love to work with. You can also send them a video of yourself performing for feedback and corrections. Actually, I believe that remote learning is a wonderful thing made much easier by modern technology, and while it has certain drawbacks, it does have a number of advantages as well. I won't go into this topic further as I don't want to bring this thread OT, but feel free to PM me if you wish specific information.

I had no idea that was an option, I will PM you.

Thank you for the hint.

I didn't mean to hint anything. I think you might be doing what I did to one of MH posts earlier. This is the internet after all.

It's weird to see Confucius smile but that's why I like him.

I am not sure if that story is historically accurate, but it's interesting. It's illustrating a typical problem with using oracles to this day.

(cough) me.

[woodcarver]

I'm trying to figure out how I'm going to revise the initial post with the all the translations as well as transition in to chapter 2. I walked away from the computer and I started checkmating people left and right.

 

EDIT: I'm not advocating violence or uncontrolled behavior. "The highest form of warfare attacks strategy itself"

Edited August 7, 2015 by woodcarver

[PLB]

The element in the book that strikes me most sharply is the evaluation of power. If one is most succesful, conflict never appears in plain sight because the situation is made into one that does not require war. As admirable as that quality may be, we mostly fall short of it.

So the the goal is realistic but underscores a lack of resources. Both in oneself and others.

That is the pragmatic part. The rest is a painful description of the consequences of failing to be pragmatic.

[dust]

I'm trying to figure out how I'm going to revise the initial post with the all the translations as well as transition in to chapter 2.

 

Well don't labour too hard on adding translations based on my suggestion; like I said, I know very little, and my evaluation of any translation at this point isn't worth much.

 

I spent a while yesterday comparing the Giles and Sonshi versions of a single line (a line MH quoted, According as circumstances are favorable, one should modify one's plans.). The 2 versions are quite different, so I wrote out a whole response comparing each word choice and similar choices from other chapters, and attempted my own translation, before I realized that they both got the point across pretty well.

 

Points being, I don't know much, and a variety of (good) translations is almost never detrimental..

[Marblehead]

I don't know how much structure Y'all would like to see in this study but I think we should be willing to flip back and forth from a current Chapter to an earlier one whenever a thought arises.  This would include adding line translations from a different translator for comparison purposes.

 

However this thread flows I think it would be best that the same translator be used as the first post of each chapter.  This would reduce internal contradictions of the overall study.

 

Right now I have nothing more to add regarding Chapter One so whenever Y'all want to move on the Chapter Two I will be ready.

 

And, agreeing with Dusty, if there is a significant difference between translators to any line of any chapter it would be interesting to do a compare/contrast of those lines.

[Michael Sternbach]

I agree with you, Marblehead. Let's not worry too much about different versions. Unless somebody still has something to say  on the foregoing, it seems like a good moment now to move on to the next chapter, using the Minford translation again, for reasons of consistency. The Art of War does not tolerate too much fuss.

[dust]

Something else from a latecomer. Maybe useful going forward. I read something in the previous pages regarding the use of 'temple'.

 

Not sure if this was mentioned, but back then,  廟  would be reserved for referring to the temple of the Imperial palace, and could easily be referring to the Imperial palace/court itself.

 

More importantly, though, the character is paired with  算, for the structure  廟算

 

Giles, Minford, and Sonshi all translate this along the lines of "calculations in the temple", but it's more likely a phrase that originally meant something along the lines of "looking to the court or Emperor for a battle plan", and when Sunzi writes means simply "battle plan / plan an attack". The word 'temple' should not be translated so literally.

 

http://www.zdic.net/c/9/db/216675.htm

Edited August 8, 2015 by dustybeijing

[woodcarver]

Seems like everyone is on the same page on the Giles translation. Also I probably wont make durastic changes of any sort when all is well in the kingdom. Ladies and gentlemen, Chapter 2:

 

II. Waging War

1. Sun Tzu said: In the operations of war, where there are in the field a thousand swift chariots, as many heavy chariots, and a hundred thousand mail-clad soldiers, with provisions enough to carry them a thousand li, the expenditure at home and at the front, including entertainment of guests, small items such as glue and paint, and sums spent on chariots and armor, will reach the total of a thousand ounces of silver per day. Such is the cost of raising an army of 100,000 men.

2. When you engage in actual fighting, if victory is long in coming, then men's weapons will grow dull and their ardor will be damped. If you lay siege to a town, you will exhaust your strength.

3. Again, if the campaign is protracted, the resources of the State will not be equal to the strain.

4. Now, when your weapons are dulled, your ardor damped, your strength exhausted and your treasure spent, other chieftains will spring up to take advantage of your extremity. Then no man, however wise, will be able to avert the consequences that must ensue.

5. Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays.

6. There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare.

7. It is only one who is thoroughly acquainted with the evils of war that can thoroughly understand the profitable way of carrying it on.

8. The skillful soldier does not raise a second levy, neither are his supply-wagons loaded more than twice.

9. Bring war material with you from home, but forage on the enemy. Thus the army will have food enough for its needs.

10. Poverty of the State exchequer causes an army to be maintained by contributions from a distance. Contributing to maintain an army at a distance causes the people to be impoverished.

11. On the other hand, the proximity of an army causes prices to go up; and high prices cause the people's substance to be drained away.

12. When their substance is drained away, the peasantry will be afflicted by heavy exactions.

13,14. With this loss of substance and exhaustion of strength, the homes of the people will be stripped bare, and three-tenths of their income will be dissipated; while government expenses for broken chariots, worn-out horses, breast-plates and helmets, bows and arrows, spears and shields, protective mantles, draught-oxen and heavy wagons, will amount to four-tenths of its total revenue.

15. Hence a wise general makes a point of foraging on the enemy. One cartload of the enemy's provisions is equivalent to twenty of one's own, and likewise a single picul of his provender is equivalent to twenty from one's own store.

16. Now in order to kill the enemy, our men must be roused to anger; that there may be advantage from defeating the enemy, they must have their rewards.

17. Therefore in chariot fighting, when ten or more chariots have been taken, those should be rewarded who took the first. Our own flags should be substituted for those of the enemy, and the chariots mingled and used in conjunction with ours. The captured soldiers should be kindly treated and kept.

18. This is called, using the conquered foe to augment one's own strength.

19. In war, then, let your great object be victory, not lengthy campaigns.

20. Thus it may be known that the leader of armies is the arbiter of the people's fate, the man on whom it depends whether the nation shall be in peace or in peril.

 

[Marblehead]

Just a first comment:  Hannibal learned that lesson the hard way (with failure).

[woodcarver]

Just a first comment:  Hannibal learned that lesson the hard way (with failure).

Another person I need to look into. I haven't read through this chapter yet for the discussion but before then I feel obligated to warn people about it.

 

I have completed the calculations before and used this book as instructed. I was in a position of undertaking immense physical harm but I don't think I could have died. This is a book of life and death and should only be used (fully) in that situation. Eventually somebody ended up using the book on me which was even worse. I stress the dispicable outcome in my first post for a reason.

[dust]

故兵聞拙速，未睹巧之久也；夫兵久而國利者，未之有也

 

Thus, though we have heard of stupid haste in war, cleverness has never been seen associated with long delays. There is no instance of a country having benefited from prolonged warfare.

Giles

 

Therefore, I have heard of military campaigns that were clumsy but swift, but I have never seen military campaigns that were skilled but protracted. No nation has ever benefited from protracted warfare.

Sonshi

 

 

Both translations fine; and with a subtle but interesting difference. I prefer the Sonshi phrasing. Is it true though?

 

Surely there have been wars that were both inevitable and all but impossible to end quickly?

[Marblehead]

Both translations fine; and with a subtle but interesting difference. I prefer the Sonshi phrasing. Is it true though?

 

Surely there have been wars that were both inevitable and all but impossible to end quickly?

I have to suggest that it is true.  However, what it takes to end a war swiftly may be considered inhumane after the fact. 

 

Examples:

 

The war between the US and Japan ended quickly after the two bombs were dropped.

 

The war between the US and North Vietnam ended with the US being defeated.  (Peace with honor.  What BS!  There is no honor in defeat.)

 

The US wars in the Middle East are not meant to end quickly.  The wealthy in America are earning a very lot of money because of the wars.  That's what these wars are all about - money for the wealthy.  I would call this inhumane before I would call dropping the bombs inhumane.

 

 

PS to this:  I will speak to this concept again later but from an individual point of view in our every-day life.

Edited August 9, 2015 by Marblehead

[dust]

The war between the US and Japan ended quickly after the two bombs were dropped.

 

Without Manhattan, though?

 

One can argue that it was the 'skill' or 'cleverness' of the allied powers deciding to develop the Manhattan Project (and subsequently inventing the bombs), but hypothetically: If they'd failed? If they'd taken another 10 years?

 

I don't know enough detail to argue whether or not either of the World Wars, or any other war, was 'skillfully' or 'cleverly' fought by those involved. Might we not argue that at that point in history, the situation was completely different from the way it could ever have been in Sunzi's time..?

 

 

The US wars in the Middle East are not meant to end quickly.  The wealthy in America are earning a very lot of money because of the wars.  That's what these wars are all about - money for the wealthy.  I would call this inhumane before I would call dropping the bombs inhumane.

 

Indeed.

[Marblehead]

One can argue that it was the 'skill' or 'cleverness' of the allied powers deciding to develop the Manhattan Project (and subsequently inventing the bombs), but hypothetically: If they'd failed? If they'd taken another 10 years?

 

I don't know enough detail to argue whether or not either of the World Wars, or any other war, was 'skillfully' or 'cleverly' fought by those involved. Might we not argue that at that point in history, the situation was completely different from the way it could ever have been in Sunzi's time..?

Yes, Hitler's scientists were working on the bomb.  They already had some good development before the US got there hands on the knowledge and equipment.  It was so advanced that the possibility of failure was extremely low.

 

The war with Japan, if the bomb were not dropped, would have been a much more bloody affair because of the Japanese mentality to never surrender.  It would have taken many years of Allied feet on the ground before the war could ever come to an end.  And it is likely that just as many, if not more, civilians would have died if this were necessary.

 

The US pushed itself into both World Wars.  The general population was against getting involved but our politicians wanted badly to get involved and that is why our politicians set us up to be attacked.  Our politicians knew exactly what they were doing.

 

And what's more, they did the same thing for the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Iraq wars.

 

The politicians have justifiable reasons.  I don't believe them.

[Geof Nanto]

The war with Japan, if the bomb were not dropped, would have been a much more bloody affair because of the Japanese mentality to never surrender.  It would have taken many years of Allied feet on the ground before the war could ever come to an end.  And it is likely that just as many, if not more, civilians would have died if this were necessary.

 

The US pushed itself into both World Wars.  The general population was against getting involved but our politicians wanted badly to get involved and that is why our politicians set us up to be attacked.  Our politicians knew exactly what they were doing.

 

And what's more, they did the same thing for the Korean War, the Vietnam War, and the Iraq wars.

 

The politicians have justifiable reasons.  I don't believe them.

 

Yes, there's a saying that the first casualty of war is truth. But as to Japan's surrender, there is plenty of research showing that the Japanese were actively seeking surrender many months before the bombing of Hiroshima and Nagasaki in August 1945. For instance.... 

 

 

A Secret Memorandum

 

It was only after the war that the American public learned about Japan's efforts to bring the conflict to an end. Chicago Tribune reporter Walter Trohan, for example, was obliged by wartime censorship to withhold for seven months one of the most important stories of the war.

 

In an article that finally appeared August 19, 1945, on the front pages of the Chicago Tribune and the Washington Times-Herald, Trohan revealed that on January 20, 1945, two days prior to his departure for the Yalta meeting with Stalin and Churchill, President Roosevelt received a 40-page memorandum from General Douglas MacArthur outlining five separate surrender overtures from high-level Japanese officials. (The complete text of Trohan's article is in the Winter 1985-86Journal, pp. 508-512.)

 

This memo showed that the Japanese were offering surrender terms virtually identical to the ones ultimately accepted by the Americans at the formal surrender ceremony on September 2 -- that is, complete surrender of everything but the person of the Emperor. Specifically, the terms of these peace overtures included:

• Complete surrender of all Japanese forces and arms, at home, on island possessions, and in occupied countries.
• Occupation of Japan and its possessions by Allied troops under American direction.
• Japanese relinquishment of all territory seized during the war, as well as Manchuria, Korea and Taiwan.
• Regulation of Japanese industry to halt production of any weapons and other tools of war.
• Release of all prisoners of war and internees.
• Surrender of designated war criminals.

Is this memorandum authentic? It was supposedly leaked to Trohan by Admiral William D. Leahy, presidential Chief of Staff. (See: M. Rothbard in A. Goddard, ed., Harry Elmer Barnes: Learned Crusader [1968], pp. 327f.) Historian Harry Elmer Barnes has related (in "Hiroshima: Assault on a Beaten Foe," National Review, May 10, 1958):

The authenticity of the Trohan article was never challenged by the White House or the State Department, and for very good reason. After General MacArthur returned from Korea in 1951, his neighbor in the Waldorf Towers, former President Herbert Hoover, took the Trohan article to General MacArthur and the latter confirmed its accuracy in every detail and without qualification.

 

(from http://www.ihr.org/jhr/v16/v16n3p-4_Weber.html )

Edited August 10, 2015 by Yueya