S:C

 

Plato’s cave metaphor has to be seen it it’s context: construction of his idea of ‚the republic’ and specifically

the education of its statesmen according to his ‚proposed ideals‘ of the republic, which is in my opinion at a closer look rather totalitarian. 

 

The cave metaphor, in my opinion, originally wasn’t intended to be one of ontology or cognition per se, only as matters of influencing statesmen for the ‚so called good of the people‘ (maybe as a revenge remark on what ‚the good people‘ sentenced Socrates to.) 

 

 

So it’s comparisons are limping, in my opinion, when it comes to questions of (‚right’) cognition, so what I believe you have been debating so long.

 

Western thought concerning cognition or ‚truth‘ used mainly the reasoning of induction, e.g. taking the results of a specific case and derive to more abstract conclusions on other cases.

 

 

Other sciences rather use

the method of deduction, mainly logical assumptions whose truth relies on the

‚truth’ of their most basic premises. 

 

 

There can be several valid

deductions (different truths) who rely on different premises, that haven’t been proved. 

 

 

Premises for theories are

usually built on an interpretation (mind processing and presenting data) of

perceptions of an empirical nature (ears, eyes, nose etc.) 

 

I don’t know if that helps your case of understanding each other, if I try to reflect more in abstract what I believe you are talking about, but I will try, as I found this intriguing: 

 

Kakapo doesn’t share

Daniels premise of the ‚objective truth‘ of empirical sensations. A common

experience of sense data is therefore not seen as verification. Rather it

results in an intersubjective (self referential) experience, which some would

call a ‚relative truth‘. 

 

 

The _reasoning_ method of induction is

troublesome, as when there is one (seemingly) observation of cause and effect

(subject object duality implied), constant cause and effect relationships are

assumed and those are treated as cognition or knowledge by experience. 

 

 

One could, with a bunch of

people of one ‘thought-lineage’, argue that past experience cannot predict

future experience. One differing experience _could_ defy a seemingly

endless chain of similar past events. They _could_ be interpreted in

this case to be only *correlated* instead of relying on causality. 

 

 

Therefore the method of

induction may not claim general validity in its reasoning performance, in this ‘thought-lineage’.

As it may not _prove_ the presupposed assumption that observations will

occur in the future the same way as they have in the past: general validity can

only be claimed, when it would be impossible that this assumption could not be

true. 

 

 

But the opposite could be

true, as it contains no contradiction: future observations must not necessarily

happen as past observations. This seems at least possible. (However improbable that

might be.)

 

 

If both assumptions could

therefore be true, the assumption that observations (relying on cause and effect)

are foreseeable cannot be necessarily universally valid. The claim of the

method of induction as a being universally valid method of reasoning is

therefore deemed to be false. 

 

 

But there is also the

method of deduction, mentioned before: 

 

 

One reasoning step is

therefore deemed necessary or valid if his conclusion follows from its

premises, in other words: it is impossible for the premises to be true and the

conclusion to be false. 

 

 

If one (scientist or not) following

meticulously the method of deduction comes to an observation that – by all

reasoning steps following each other stringently – is in contradiction to his

current conclusion – he would do good to check his premises and all reasoning

steps again: the theory that had been working for his whole life, might just be

false.

 

 

 

 

 

Both methods rely on _empirical_

data to get the stamp of being ‘scientific’. 

 

 

Kakapo doesn’t accept

Daniels premise of empirical sense data being valid or true – in a

_more_ than *intersubjective* sense. This seems to be a question

that cannot be answered by science, as science relies on empirical data.

 

 

What Daniel did in his

arguments, was following the method of induction to prove his point, that Kakapos

premise of empirical sense data being either invalid or irrelevant

for a _more_ than *intersubjective* truth. But Kakapo never

did refute the intersubjective truth of empirical sense data, he

just isn’t interested in intersubjective truths relying on

empirical sense data.

 

 

They have different or

rather contradicting premises, which seems legit at this point. Premises about _pre-empirical_

data collections, no matter if done by an individual or a collective (subject-object duality implied), no matter

if referring to ‘a sphere of platonic idea(l)s’ or ‘a sphere of emptiness’ have

an ‘air’ of being un-scientific, just by mere definition of the word ‘scientific’,

in my opinion, but being – for lack of a better word – ‘beliefs’ or ‘world

views’ or ‘realities of life’.

 

 

That leaves the matter of what is the definition of ‚truth‘ rather unilluminated and ghostly.
 

To reach an understanding of common premises, I would guess you both have to agree on what your definition of „truth“ (beyond perception of empirical sense data) is and that doesn’t seem possible: In my opinion this cannot be done by scientific (e.g empirical sense data) means, as that is the root of your trouble of understanding each other. Whatever the answer is, it is not one of science, as long as science relies on empirical sense data (as it should, in my opinion.)
 

 

 

 

Realities of life or world views aren‘t truth apt in my tradition, yet (at least). That’s where you would end up with Plato’s stories (totalitarian regimes). 

 

 

 

Also I don’t believe it is necessary to change one’s world view or try to experience e.g. fully understand some one else’s. (Maybe it is, maybe it is not possible to experience for you - in your current state - and is it even an experience you‘d wish for? Is your wish for truth that intense to follow through?)

As long as one person doesn’t suffer or hurt others with their minority view, why not leave this debate unanswered? 

Again, even if you put a label like ‚conscious realism‘ on it, it limits your experience and understanding, as again that might be a better or worse interpretation of what someone is trying to say. You could maybe apply the terms of the philosophical school of monism as well or tired and tame old non-duality. 
 

When I write in spoilers I reserve the right not to be quoted. Thanks. Hope I could bring something helpful along, if not, sorry, for hopping in: I won’t do it again.